Vietnam, a transitional economy, exhibits significant segmentation in the market for skilled labor based on more remunerative employment in government and state firms. We ask whether this segmentation is also reflected in measures of households' human capital investments. We find that households with members holding jobs in state firms keep their children in school longer, spend more on education, and are more likely to enroll their children in tertiary institutions relative to households whose members hold non-state jobs. 
Macro context: policy and factor market distortions and inequality
Inequality in Vietnam is low by the standards of many comparable Asian economies, but has risen during that country's transition to "market-led socialism." Part of the rise in inequality can be explained by reference to the abolition or weakening of many socialist-era policies that repressed returns to skills and entrepreneurial activity, in which case greater income disparities might be regarded as necessary or even beneficial transitional consequences of economic liberalization. But despite huge steps toward a market economy, the Vietnamese state retains enormous power over certain domestic markets (notably those in which there is potential for monopolistic behavior) and factor markets, especially those for capital and land. It follows that part of the observed rise in inequality may be due to less positive trends, including rent capture by those with access to high-level government positions or to employment in firms that are in some way "protected" by policy or market structure. As in China, another economy undergoing a broadly similar transition, there is widespread consternation in Vietnam over the alleged capture of state-owned (or partially privatized) firms and influential public service positions by "princelings" -that is, members of the former nomenklatura and their close relatives and associates (New York Times 2012a , 2012b . The same concerns extend to many other developing economies in which privileges extended to well-connected owners of capital and land result in diminished opportunities for improvement by the owners of labor (The Economist 2012; Berg and Ostry 2012) . Paradoxically, in some economies, the structure of product and labor markets (and especially that for skilled workers) is such that the rewards to skills are significantly higher in public sector employment than in the private sector, leading to queuing and competition for such jobs (Financial Times 2012) .
In Vietnam income inequality across the state/non-state divide is clearly visible in household survey data, which also reveal that it is a phenomenon that is not limited to a few households at the very top of the political hierarchy. Figure 1 , based on representative national household data, shows that in both rural and urban areas, the per capita income distributions for sub-populations of households containing employees of either civil government ("civil households") or stateowned enterprises ("SOE households") are appreciably further to the right than those for nonstate households.
[ Figure 1 here] Why should households' labor market connections be important, and why should returns to skills be higher for state employees rather than those in the private sector? A default economic model would predict equal returns to labor of equal skills in equilibrium. Moreover, the experience of transitional economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is overwhelmingly one in which movement of white-collar workers to the private sector is strongly positively selected, reflecting more productive employment opportunities (Adamchik and Bedi 2000; Munich et al. 2005 ).
Our answer, while speculative, fits with the stylized facts of an economy in transition from command to market systems. The skill-intensity of civil service employment is high, but the demand for workers is limited by budget constraints on government agencies. SOEs, on the other hand, benefit from capital market policies that lower their borrowing costs; they therefore adopt relatively capital-intensive techniques. As capital and skills are complementarity, more highly educated workers are drawn to these firms and will compete to be hired. But since SOEs are typically oriented to the provision of goods and services to the domestic market, their expansion-and thus their demand for labor-is bounded in ways that do not apply to competitive firms in tradable industries. What both sets of institutions have in common, however, is access to rents, which when shared out among their workers, generate potential for incomes that are higher than the earnings of equivalent workers in competitive industries. Non-state firms, meanwhile, suffer from crowding out in capital markets and thus adopt less capital-intensive techniques. In these firms, capital-skills complementarity means they will hire fewer skilled workers, and will offer to compensate them at a lower rate, commensurate with their lower value marginal product.
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In this system, segmentation in the skilled labor market arises indirectly, from capital market distortions, market structure, and budget constraints limiting hiring by government departments.
This segmentation is visible as queuing by applicants and demands for up-front payments from prospective employees. The difference in earnings for equivalent workers at each type of firm will persist so long as the favored firms face market or regulatory conditions that generate rents and so encourage them to restrict hiring. Thus capital market policies will lead to job rationing and incentives for corrupt behavior across a wide spectrum of the white-collar labor market, not merely among the few that have direct access to the highest levels of political power.
In earlier work (Phan and Coxhead 2012) we uncovered evidence in support of an important part of the above narrative. Vietnam displays a high degree of industrial policy distortion, with a clear bias in favor of state-owned enterprises in the markets for banking sector credit, equity capital, and land (World Bank 2006; Sjoholm 2008; Hakkala and Kokko 2008; Leung, 2009; Nixson et al. 2010 , IMF 2012 and in trade and pricing policies (Athukorala 2010) . We discovered a highly significant state-sector premium in earnings and in returns to education; as of 2008, this premium had persisted despite two decades of economic reforms. We also found that family connections to state sector employers increase an individual's own probability of having a state sector job.
Together, these results indicate that connections to the state sector increase individual earnings and returns on human capital investments, and that these effects operate at least in part through household-level connections.
2 A recent study using labor force data covering five broad industrial sectors confirms this prediction, finding that in manufacturing, post-secondary qualifications earn a premium of only 40-50% over primary education, and concluding that "there is currently not a strong demand for workers with either professional training or tertiary education in either low-value or medium-value industries… workers with post-secondary qualifications are therefore likely to gravitate towards better-remunerated jobs in government and administration and the services" (Baulch et al. 2012:22-23) .
A country's long-term economic growth depends on its ability to accumulate human capital, and the acquisition of human capital is a key determinant of improvements in individual earning power. The preceding narrative suggests that in the presence of certain policies and capital market distortions, household-level incentives for human capital investments will depend, in part, on the likelihood that children will be able to secure a job in which skills are rewarded. If this probability is viewed as small, then capital-constrained parents will spend less on education and/or withdraw children from school earlier; those children will enter the labor force at a younger age and with less formal training. Their lifetime earnings profiles will be flatter, and thus their capacity to invest in the education of their own children will be diminished. In this way, initial household-level disparities in opportunity may become persistent over more than one generation. Moreover, the potential productivity of less-educated workers will also be lower, so in the absence of remedial measures the economy as a whole will face a diminished growth rate and lower steady-state income per capita relative to the counterfactual of no capital market distortion.
In this paper, we seek to test the hypothesis that households with close connections to the state sector invest more in their children's human capital. Specifically, we ask whether children from households containing state employees are more likely to attend high school or university, and whether these households spend more on the education of their children. The former question explores the extensive margin of educational attainment in an economy where only a small minority of school-leavers continues on to higher education. The latter question investigates the intensive margin of educational investments in a system in which household spending on discretionary educational items, such as tutors and private schools, is an important component of total educational expenditures.
After controlling for characteristics of the potential student, the household head, and the household we find robust evidence that children from households whose heads work for government are more likely to attend high school or university, and that these households also spend more on their children's education. The effect on educational investment for individuals whose household heads work for state-owned enterprises is also generally positive, but this effect is not robust across different econometric models.
Our work extends the existing literature on inequality in access to education by identifying and focusing on a previously neglected dimension of inequality. The state/non-state dichotomy among households proves to be an important dividing line for investments in the most growthoriented form of individual and household capital, education. Policies that restrict or diminish access to schooling or incentives to remain in school create and exacerbate inequality, a phenomenon now widely seen as reducing growth (Stiglitz 2012). They also reduce the efficacy of efforts to promote and sustain aggregate economic growth through movement up the product quality ladder.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review basic data and trends on educational attainment and related indicators in Vietnam. In section 3 we motivate a somewhat deeper analysis and conduct an econometric exploration of our main hypotheses. In section 4 we discuss our results, and in section 5 we draw some tentative conclusions, speculate on the generalizability of our findings, and propose some avenues for future research.
A new dimension of inequality: state and non-state households

2a. Data
Our primary data source is the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey, with rounds in 1993, 1998, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008 . These surveys gather data on household income and expenditure and are designed to measure living conditions and poverty and inequality (Grosh and Glewwe 2000) . They are intended to be representative at the national and provincial levels.
They also include modules on education and on employment and wages. Early rounds of VHLSS were smaller in size (4,800 households in 1993 and 6,000 in 1998). The survey year 2002 had the largest number of households (29, 533) . In the most recent three rounds, the number of households surveyed has stabilized at around 9,000. For most empirical work in the current version of this paper, we use data from the VHLSS 2006 only, because this survey year has an extended education module. We intend to expand the sample size to include other survey years in the next version of our paper.
To measure years of education, most other studies using VHLSS data have used the survey's original schooling year variable, which ranges from 0 through 12 years. We adjust schooling years for highest educational level (junior college corresponds to 14 years of education, a college degree 16 years, master's degree 18 years, and Ph.D. 21 years). As a result, our calculated years of schooling are higher than other studies.
In the descriptive analysis in the next section we also use the Vietnam Enterprise Survey for data on firms. This is an annual survey begun in 2000.
3 It covers all enterprises with independent accounting systems that are established under and governed by the Law on State-owned Enterprises, the Law on Cooperatives, the Law on Enterprises, and the Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam. All formal sectors and industries, including agriculture, are covered;
however, because the criterion for inclusion in the survey is establishment and governance under the law, the informal sector is largely ignored. The survey questionnaire includes various business and production activities: labor and employment, incomes of employees, number of establishments, assets and liabilities, investments, capital stock, production costs, turnover, products, profits, inventories, taxes, R&D investments, IT applications, and others.
2b. Employment and wages in state and non-state firms
In the course of Vietnam's more than 20 years of transition to a market economy, the state sector has retained an extraordinarily prominent role. SOEs account for between one-third and twofifths of economic activity. According to the VHLSS, employment in SOEs has even risen as a share of total wage labor employment (which itself has risen substantially since the 1990s). Table 1 provides a summary of employment by ownership type.
[ Table 1 here] Table 2 confirms that state sector firms are far more intensive in their use of educated workers than are non-state firms. Although the average years of education for non-state workers has risen steadily, from 5.6 in 1993 to 7.8 in 2008, this figure still remains far below years of education in state sector firms. Moreover, as Table 3 shows, the proportion of workers in non-state firms with a college degree remains extremely low (1.8% in 2008) by comparison with state firms (30%).
[ Tables 2 and 3 here] One reason for the higher skill-intensity of state sector employment is that some jobs in this sector are government administrative positions that require higher education. Another important reason is technological: capital and skills are complements in production (Griliches 1969) . Table   4 reveals much higher capital per worker in state and foreign-invested firms compared to nonstate firms. In the case of SOEs this is undoubtedly the result of their privileged access to capital.
Combination of technological factors and policy distortions results in higher SOE demand for skilled workers.
[ Table 4 here]
These differentials in capital and skill intensities between state and non-state firms no doubt contribute to the discrepancy in average hourly wages, as shown in Table 5 . In 1993, workers in the state sector earned less on average than workers in the non-state sector. But this was prior to the implementation of most market and labor reforms; since then, they have earned about 40% more per hour than non-state workers. Of course, these are simple averages and do not take account of differences in the composition of the labor force in each type of firm. But as mentioned earlier, our earlier econometric investigation confirms that workers in state firms indeed receive higher returns to education, even after controlling for many differences in worker and job characteristics, and that far from being erased by the economic transition, this disparity has increased over time (Phan and Coxhead 2012) .
[ Table 5 here]
2c. Educational attainment and investments by state and non-state households
There is a large literature on the influence of family environment on human capital investments (for a recent and highly relevant survey, see Yi et al. 2011 We now turn to the examination of such data.
In this section we use three different measures of educational attainment and investments:
average years of schooling, net and gross enrollment rates in different levels of schooling, 6 and household educational expenditures. No matter which measure we use, state households (those with at least one member working for a state firm or for the government) tend to invest more in the education of their children. Figure 2 shows that for all age groups, the average years of schooling of children from state households are higher than those of children from non-state households. The differences in means are small at lower levels of education, but widen progressively through college. Figures 3a and 3b reveal a similar story. Net and gross enrollment rates are higher for children from state households in both rural and urban areas.
Again, the differences are the most stark at the college level-the level most relevant for the 4 See esp. their fn 21, a discussion of the "true" meaning of parental education, which has been shown to have a strong influence over schooling outcomes for children. Parts of this literature explore just what parental education stands for -whether income, or cultural norms favoring education, or other things. 5 And compare these differentials in similar countries, such as China (Wang et al. 2011) 6 Net enrollment rate is the ratio of enrolled children in the official school age group over the total number of children in that age group. Gross enrollment rate is the ratio of enrolled children of all ages over the total number of children in the official school age group. skilled labor market. Finally, Figure 4 confirms once more the disparity between the two groups:
state households tend to spend more on education than do non-state households, in both rural and urban areas.
[ Figures 2, 3a , 3b, and 4 here] In summary, firm-level data indicate a large premium for educated workers employed in the state sector, while household-level data point to the importance of having a connection to the state sector. If having a relative with a state sector job means easier access for others in the same family, then schooling decisions appear to be driven (at least in part) by access to jobs in the favored sector.
There are however many covariates that are not controlled for when we analyze descriptive data.
Therefore we now turn to a more rigorous examination of the determinants of household educational investment.
Determinants of household educational attainment and investment
3a. Empirical strategy
Our goal is to study the determinants of household investments in education. Since, as is well known, education is often terminated at discrete points such as the completion of a given level of schooling, we focus on specific schooling decisions. These are first, the decision to enroll a potential student in university given that a high school diploma is already attained, and second, the decision to enroll a child in high school given completion of middle school. Our empirical strategy is based on well-established human capital theory (Schultz 1960 and 1963 , Becker 1964 and 1981 . This maintains that household demand for education is affected by expected returns (r) and costs (c, including direct and opportunity costs) of education:
where y i is a dummy indicating whether the potential student i enrolls in university (or high school), and D i is a vector of demographic variables such as gender, age, and other control factors.
Our primary focus is on explaining differential incentives to invest in education, given differences in expected returns to education due to unequal access to state sector jobs. That is, the decision to progress from middle to high school, or to enroll in tertiary education, takes into account the trajectory of returns to education in state and non-state employment adjusted by the probabilities of employment in either sector. On the basis of our previous work (Phan and Coxhead 2012), we assume that the average rate of return to education in the state sector (r S ) is higher than that in the non-state sector (r N ). If ρ i is the probability of state sector employment for potential student i, then his expected returns to education is r i = r S ρ i + r N (1-ρ i ), and
Under the assumption of uniformity within each employment sector, we can normalize r N = 1 and rewrite r i = 1 + [r S -1]ρ i . Assume that y i has a binomial distribution B(n i , π i ), where π i is the underlying probability that a potential student enrolls in high school or university, and n i is the binomial denominator. Assume further that the logit of the underlying probability π i is linear in its predictors. Then
Our variable of interest is ρ i , the probability of getting a state sector job. Lacking direct observations on this variable, we use as proxies two variables: an "SOE" dummy which equals 1 if household head works for a state firm, and a "civil" dummy equal to 1 if the head of household works for civil government. These dummies aim to capture a household's connection to the state sector, either state-owned enterprises or the government. The null hypothesis is that these dummies are not statistically different from zero; that is, the sector of employment of a potential student's household head has no effect on probability of high school or university enrollment.
Rejection of the null is evidence of state employment as a source of household differences in educational access or incentives. We discuss the implications of such a finding in section 4.
We include three other sets of explanatory variables to capture c i and D i :
• Household characteristics: log of household income or expenditure, household composition by age, urban or regional dummies, ethnic minority dummy;
• Household head characteristics: age, gender (equals 1 if male), years of schooling, and skill dummy (equals 1 if household head holds a skilled job) ;
• Child characteristics: gender (equals 1 if male), age, and age squared.
Among the control variables, those with greatest economic interest are the household head's years of schooling and the household's ability to finance education, as measured by either household income or expenditure. A large empirical literature confirms that more educated parents tend to invest more in the education of their own children, and that wealthier households are more able to pay for education and to keep children out of the labor force until a later age.
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Hence their children should have higher educational attainment and we should observe higher level of educational investment in these households, other things equal.
In addition to estimating the probability of university or high school enrollment, we also estimate household educational expenditure, another measure of household educational investment. Since 2,945 households (out of a sample of 9,186 households, or 32%) have zero educational expenditure, our sample suffers from censoring. As a result, we use a Tobit model for this estimation.
There is one potential problem with our regressions. The various important characteristics of household heads--SOE dummy, civil dummy, skill dummy, schooling years-are all correlated in varying degrees, and they are also correlated with household income or expenditure. In a small sample this multicollinearity could be the cause of inefficiency and parameter instability. Even though our sample is large (N = 4,955 for the university enrollment model, and N = 9,204 for the high school enrollment model), the fraction of individuals attending university is not high (11%), and the share of households with heads working for state-owned enterprises is low (6%). We explore and discuss this issue of parameter stability in the next section.
3b. Results
Our empirical results are presented in Tables 6, 7 , and 8. In Table 6 , we use a logistic regression to estimate the probability that an individual with a high school diploma enrolls in university. To measure households' wealth, or their ability to finance education, we use household total income in model (I) and household total expenditure in model (II). In Table 7 , also using logit, we estimate the probability that an individual having completed middle school will continue to high school. We again use both household income (model III) and expenditure (model IV) to capture households' financial capacity. In Table 8 , we estimate the determinants of households' educational expenditures (model V) or the share of education in total household expenditures (model VI).
For brevity, we restrict our discussion to the main variables of interest, the effects of the civil and SOE dummies. In all models and specifications, the civil dummy (which equals one if the household head works for government) has a statistically significant and positive impact on educational investments. From model (I) in Table 6 , the likelihood that an individual in a household whose head works for government will enroll in university is 1.5 times that of someone in a household whose head works elsewhere. The effect on high school enrollments is even higher: living in a household whose head works for government almost doubles the likelihood of continuing from middle to high school (see Table 7 ). The results also carry through to educational expenditures. In households whose head holds a government job the log of educational expenditure is higher by about 0.68 (model (V) in Table 8 ). This amounts to educational expenditure that is higher by 97%, a substantial amount.
[Tables 6, 7 and here]
The SOE dummy also tends to be positive, suggesting that having a household head in a state 8 The estimated coefficient is 0.68, so e 0.68 = 1.97, which implies a 97% increase in educational expenditure.
firm tends to positively affect educational investment. But this effect is statistically significant only for the probability of high school enrollment in Table 7 , and for the log of household educational expenditure in model V in Table 8 . The magnitude of the effect also tends to be smaller than that of civil dummy (except in model V in Table 8 ). One potential reason for this lack of robustness and significance is that there are correlations among important control factors, especially characteristics of household head (see Table 9 ). Such correlations might cause multicollinearity, inflating the standard errors, and causing parameter instability as correlated control variables are introduced or dropped from the model. These issues are much more serious in smaller samples. In the case of SOE dummy, there are only 304 observations from a sample of 4,955 potential students in which the household head works for a state firm. Out of these 304 observations, there are only 45 individuals who attend university. In future work we plan to increase the sample size by including other VHLSS survey years. A larger sample might produce more robust results.
[ Table 9 here]
In short, we find robust evidence that connections to government jobs increase household educational investments. We find similarly positive, though weaker evidence of the influence of SOE jobs on such investments. Together, these results tell us that after controlling for other known predictors of human capital investments, in Vietnam the proximity of a household to state employment significantly increases the likelihood that its children will progress from middle to high school, and from there enroll in tertiary studies.
Discussion
Our estimation has decisively rejected the null hypothesis of no effect of state employment on schooling investments. This result, if of sufficiently large economic magnitude, has implications for equity and for economic growth in the long run, or for as long as the underlying distortions that give rise to state sector wage premia and labor market segmentation persist.
When there is rationing in the market for skills, initial discrepancies in the household distribution of income-or more precisely, of household assets including claims on state-sector jobs-could be transmitted across generations. It follows (although we do not addressed this directly) that unequal access to education and an unequal distribution of incentives to complete high school and enroll in tertiary education could both exacerbate initial inequality and increase the rate at which the fortunes of favored and less favored households diverge. Although our model should be viewed as referring to a local rather than global set of parameter values, in the region of these values there can be no presumption of a secular reduction in the inequality of household incomes. Inequalities in educational access and incentives are likely to persist. This is in contrast to many other predictions about inequality in the development process, such as the Kuznets prediction.
Our result is an empirical elaboration of a point that has been made before in reference to other settings. Becker and Tomes (1993) , for example, explore the potential of capital market imperfections to lower parents' investments in their children's acquisition of human capital. The
Vietnamese data suggest two potentially interesting twists on this account. First, it is not only access to credit that distinguishes the fortunes of one family from those of another. Labor market segmentation may also give rise to a structural disparity that is hard for households to bridge.
Second, and related to this, in our data it appears that a key asset that parents can bequeath to their children is access to state jobs, and this in turn conditions the expected rate of return to the latters' education. But access, like human capital itself, does not function well as collateral. Two implications follow. It follows, first, that even if a household could self-finance a higher level of education for its children, that investment might still not pay off in the labor market. Second, public policies aimed at broadening access to education might not yield expected increases in enrollments if incentives remain subject to a distortion that dictates that the probability of getting a job that rewards additional human capital investments is low.
The second implication of our result has to do with long-run economic growth. In low-income countries, and even more in economies in transition, initial aggregate growth is sustained by resource mobilization and efficiency gains due to economic policy reforms. But in the longer run, continued growth relies on increases in total factor productivity and investments in reproducible factors of production, most notably human capital. Developing economies that under-invest in human capital are at high risk of falling in to the so-called "middle income trap."
Our results suggest that for a large majority of the Vietnamese wage labor force, the probability of getting a job in an industry or occupation where returns to education are will justify the cost is very low. Even if other constraints (such as access to credit) do not bind, some fraction of high school and college-age children are opting out of educational investments to join the unskilled or semi-skilled labor force.
It may be possible for these individuals to acquire additional skills later in life, for example through vocational training or on-the-job training, but at present, neither of these channels appears promising in Vietnam. Vocational training is not widespread, nor is it respected by employers (Chirot and Wilkinson 2009) . And due to the crowding-out of banking sector capital for small and medium enterprises, capital intensity outside of the state sectors and a few other well-connected industries is very low; accordingly, returns to education are also low in these industries (Baulch et al., 2012) . So Vietnam confronts a future in which a large part of its adult labor force is inadequately prepared to support a move up the product quality ladder, from assembly to innovation.
Finally, equity and long-run growth are increasingly widely regarded as positively linked. In a recent article, The Economist discusses the rise in within-country inequality around the world:
If income gaps get wide enough, they can lead to less equality of opportunity, especially in education. Social mobility in America, contrary to conventional wisdom, is lower than in most European countries. The gap in test scores between rich and poor American children is roughly 30-40% wider than it was 25 years ago. And by some measures class mobility is even stickier in China than in America ("True Progressivism", 13 October 2012).
The Economist's primary proposed remedy is to dismantle monopolies and vested interests, be they state-owned enterprises in China, India's "unequal oligarchy or worse," 9 or big banks on Wall Street. Although inequality in Vietnam, by the usual measures, is much lower than in these economies, so too is per capita income; therefore, the prospect of a decline in growth rates due to inequality of access to human capital investments must nevertheless be treated very seriously.
9 Raghuram Rajan as quoted in The Economist 2012.
Finally, our data are drawn from just one developing economy, but there are strong indications that the analysis is relevant to a larger group. In many countries with less restrictive regimes than Vietnam, private firms enjoy qualitatively similar positions to SOEs in terms of their access to domestic capital, dominance in domestic markets, and connections to political decision-makers.
Finally, state involvement in developing economies is not disappearing as quickly as was perhaps expected in the post-Cold War, Washington Consensus era. In fact there are some recent signs of a resurgence of state engagement in larger developing economies. 10 Thus the role of connections to state employment, so highly significant in the case of one rather heavily distorted developing economy, may well be present, albeit less starkly, in many others.
Some conclusions
In this paper we have explored a hitherto neglected dimension of inequality, that arising in a transitional developing economy between households connected to the state and households lacking such a connection. Data from Vietnam's household living standards survey confirm a substantial difference in per capita incomes across this divide. Our research then reveals that the state/non-state dichotomy also marks a significant discrepancy in households' educational investments in their children. When state employers are the largest demanders of skills, and when they compensate those skills far more generously, on average, than do non-state employers, there is competition among workers to win state jobs. These are effectively rationed by public sector budget constraints and limited domestic markets for the goods and services produced by state-owned corporations. As a result, connections based on family ties become important factors raising the probability of winning a state sector job. Households for which these connections are strong tend to invest more heavily than others in the education of their offspring. In other households, the data suggest that opportunity cost drives children out of education earlier and at lower levels, and that households invest less in educational expenditure. 10 The Economist, 21 July 2012, "The great slowdown" comments on this as follows: "Sadly, many emerging-world governments have interpreted the crisis in rich-world finance as a reason to preserve a more muscular role for the state. China has reserved some sectors for state-owned enterprises. In Brazil the big state-controlled oil company, Petrobras, and the state-controlled banks have become virtual appendages of government policy. Having so much leverage over the economy is indeed helpful during a crisis, but in the long run it will stifle competition, starve the private sector of capital, deter foreign investment and know-how, and breed corruption."
These divisions depend on policy, not on secular development trends, and so could well persist across generations, creating a two-track labor market of "princelings" and "paupers", relatively speaking.
International evidence suggests further that unequal access to productive human capital investments will in the long run lead to slower rates of aggregate economic growth. If so, and if our findings are indeed robust, then Vietnam faces an earlier onset of the "middle income trap" than would be the case under a counterfactual of more open policies leading to a more level field for labor and education. The prior experience of other regional economies like Malaysia and
Thailand pinpoints underinvestment in human capital formation as a key contributing factor to growth slowdowns and vulnerability to economic crises (Booth 2003; Warr 2005) . These are valuable lessons for Vietnamese policymakers. The insight from the work described in this paper is that the human capital problem will not necessarily be resolved simply by increasing the supply of educational infrastructure, teachers, and complementary services. There is a potentially binding demand side constraint, and this can only be addressed through more wideranging structural reforms.
Our findings in this paper should be seen as preliminary. The key variables are characterized by severe multicollinearity, and this inhibits a more robust identification of some parameter estimates. Future work with a larger data set may help resolve this problem. More broadly, our results are necessarily conditional on a set of parameters that is subject to change. In particular, the dichotomy of labor productivity (and thus of returns to skills) between state and non-state sectors is sensitive to sweeping reforms that diminish the relative attractiveness of state sector jobs, and to the availability of foreign capital by domestic non-state firms (since this will increase their demand for skilled workers). Whether either of these changes becomes sufficiently influential in Vietnam's near future remains an open question. Bold means statistically significant at 5% level or less; Italic means statistically significant at 5--10% level F--test null hypothesis: skill dummy = SOE dummy = civil dummy = 0 
